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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann., Sec.78-2-3(j), (2001).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In this case, Appellee (de Groot) billed Appellants (Gallachers) for a balance owed
upon a building contract, and received no response, then timely filed a mechanics lien for the
balance owed. The contract signed by the parties referred all disputes arising out of the
contract to arbitration, but never waived in any way, deGroot's rights under Utah's
mechanics lien statutes or the attorneys fees provided thereunder. The contract was totally
silent as to mechanics liens and attorneys fees. DeGroot gave notice of this lien to
Gallachers, as required by law for the recovery of attorneys fees under Sec. 38-1-18 Utah
Code Ann., and still no payment or any other response was made by Gallacher. DeGroot
then filed an action for the balance owed plus attorneys fees and to foreclose de Groot9 s
mechanics lien for that sum upon the real property. The matter was referred to an arbitrator
and de Groot thereafter obtained an arbitration award of about eightyfivepercent of its claim
made in the mechanics lien claim; but the arbitrator ruled that each party had to bear its own
attorneys fees. Did deGroot commit an act of bad faith by moving the trial court to award
attorneys fees under Sec. 38-1-18, Utah Code Ann. for the attorneys fees and costs
necessarily incurred by de Groot in recording the mechanics lien andfilingthe action and
for the attorneys fees incurred in the arbitration which then occurred to determine the amount
owed to deGroot and to be foreclosed under the mechanics lien statutes? In the alternative,
did the trial court breach its discretion in refusing to grant Gallacher attorneys fees for the
1
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post arbitration motions filed by deGroot?
The standard of appellate review of refusal by a trial court tofindbad faith on the part
of a party, is whether or not the trial court was "clearly erroneous" in its decision. Warner
v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT102, 20P3rd868, 874. (Utah 2000/ The standard of review
as to a refusal by a trial court to award fees under Sec. 78-3 la-16 (1985) is whether or not
the trial court breached its very broad discretionary powers under that statute, as the word
"may"is used as to whether or not a party will be awarded attorneys fees by the court.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Section 38-1-18, Utah Code Annotated:
"Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any action brought to enforce
any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorneys'fee to befixedby the court, which shall be taxed as costs
in the action."
Section 78-31 a-16, Utah Code Annotated:
"An award which is confirmed, modified, or corrected by the court shall be
treated and enforced in all respects as a judgment. Costs incurred incident
to any motion authorized by this chapter, including a reasonable attorney's
fee, unless precluded by the arbitration agreement, may be awarded by the
Court."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DeGroot, at the request of the defendant, R.T. Gallacher Investments, LLC,
constructed a house in Park City, Utah, which was owned by the defendant Richard
Gallacher. DeGroot claimed a balance due of $9,881.83, and billed Mir Gallacher with
various invoices which Gallacher failed to pay (R.37-35).
2

DeGroot then recorded a
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mechanics lien for that amount and sent a true copy of this lien to the defendant Richard
Gallacher by certified mail, return receipt requested, as required by Sec. 38-1-18 Utah Code
Ann. (Complaint R.4-1 and Arbitrators Findings, R. 53) neither Mr. Gallacher, or R.T.
Gallacher LLC. responded in any way to deGroot's billings to them for the balance due,
or the notice of the mechanics lien. Plaintiff then filed a mechanics lien foreclosure action
in order to perfect and foreclose its lien and to collect the balance due, plus attorneys fees
pursuant to Sec. 38-1-18 Utah Code Ann. (R.4-1). The defendants, after being served,
responded with a motion to arbitrate and the plaintiff requested arbitration.
The arbitration agreement made no mention of mechanics liens or the entitlement to
attorneys fees under the mechanics lien statutes, or attorneys fees in any respect, but
provided:
"15.8 All claims or disputes between the Contractor and the Owner arising out
of or relating to the Contract Documents or the breach thereof, shall be
decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association....The award
rendered by the arbitrator or arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may
entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having
jurisdiction thereof.,?(R. 12-11)
The arbitrator, after a two day hearing, madefindingsand an award to Plaintiff in the
total sum of $8,636.43 plus one-half of the $500.00 administrative fee paid by plaintiff, and
interest at 10 percent per annum(R. 56 - 34), and made the ruling that each party was to bear
their own attorneys fees.(R. 49). Plaintiff then moved for the Entry ofJudgment Based upon
Arbitration Award and moved the court to Award Attorneys Fees or in the alternative, have
the Arbitrator make findings as to which party was the successful party in the arbitration.
3
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(R33-25). The court sent the case back to the Arbitrator for clarification of his ruling,
refusing to ask the arbitrator who was the "prevailing party". The Arbitrator then correctly
concluded that the matter of attorneys fees under the mechanics lien statute was for the
court to decide, as the Agreement made no provision as to attorneys fees. DeGroot then
moved the court to award attorneys fees, as the successful party under the mechanics lien
statute and the court denied this motion . DeGroot appealed this decision to this Court;
however, after several stipulations for extension had been given, at a time beyond the last
stipulation could not obtain a stipulation of extension of time in which to file the brief from
Gallachers' counsel, leaving only this cross appeal for attorneys fees by Gallacher.
Gallacher had requested attorneys fees for the post arbitration motions, which the lower court
denied.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
The parties signed the Agreement (Appendix A, Appellant's brief) to construct a
house in Park City, Utah. The Agreement was silent as to attorneys fees in the event of
failure to pay on the part of Appellants (Gallachers). All disputes arising out of the contract
documents were to be referred to arbitration, as above recited. DeGroot billed Gallachers,
with no response, timely filed a mechanics lien, sent a true copy thereof to Gallachers by
certified mail, return receipt requested, still receiving no response, deGrootfileda mechanics
lien foreclosure action for the amount due plus attorneys fees under the mechanics lien
statutes as set forth in the Statement of the Case, Supra., with the result that the matter was
4
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referred to an Arbitrator, who awarded deGroot about 85% of what it claimed owed.
DeGroot then moved the lower court to enter the award as a judgment in the foreclosure case
and to award attorneys fees as provided for in Sec.38-1-18, Utah Code Ann.
One ofthe provisions ofthe Arbitrator5 s award was that both parties were to bear their
own attorneys fees (R.49). In thefirstmemo of law to the court, (R.31-28 and Appellees
Appendix, pp.31 -28) deGroot pointed out that the original ruling by the Arbitrator that "each
party was to bear its own attorneys fees" was beyond the power of the Arbitrator, because
the Agreement signed by the parties was totally silent as to attorneys fees, and did not make
any mention of any of the mechanics lien statutory rights, including attorneys fees, thus
should not have been considered or fuled upon by the arbitrator. (R.84) The trial court sent
the matter back to the arbitrator for clarification of his ruling and the arbitrator concluded
that the reason that he made such a ruling was that the contract between the parties was
silent as to attorneys fees and further, Sec. 38-1-18 Utah Code Ann. provides that attorneys
fees are to be "fixed by the court", not the arbitrator.(R104) .
Up to that point, deGroot agreed with the arbitrator's second decision. However, the
Arbitrator, again exceeded his authority by further ruling "...any attorneys fees to be
awarded in the dispute between the parties would be those incurred in connection with the
court proceeding to foreclose the mechanics lien...". (R104) Such a decision could be
construed to limit the attorneys fees incurred by deGroot to only the time spent infilingthe
mechanic's lien and filing the action, but not the time spent in pursuing the issue of
determining the amount to be foreclosed in the action, a necessary prerequisite to foreclosing
5
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the mechanics lien. Accordingly, deGroot objected to this part of the Arbitrator's second
ruling, as the Arbitrator had no power in fact or in law to make such a decision Pacific
Development v. Ortom 2000 Ut. 36, 23 P3rd 1035, 1039-40, Utah 2001} (Rl 12-110 and
Appellant's Appendix).
DeGroot further pointed out to the lower court in the second motion, that the general
rule in the United States is that even though no attorney's fees are mentioned in an arbitration
agreement, attorneys fees expended during arbitration proceedings required to determine the
amount to be foreclosed in a mechanics lien proceeding should be awarded under the
mechanic's lien statutes where requested by the prevailing party and cited to the court the
secondary and case law supporting this rule (Rl 10). Accordingly, deGroot moved the trial
court to award all of the attorneys fees and court costs incurred by it pursuant to Sec. 38-118, Utah Code Ann. because it was indisputably the successful party in the arbitration
proceeding, which was necessary to bring the mechanic's lien case to a conclusion (Rl 14101).
In the meantime, the Gallachers never paid any money upon the arbitrator's award
rendered on July 9,2001 (R.55), until March 8,2002 (R. 115), after deGroot's second motion
to award attorneys fees, some eight months after the award, and even then, failed to pay the
one-half of the initial arbitration filing fee awarded by the Arbitrator.
In reply to deGroot's citation of authority in favor of awarding attorneys fees to a
prevailing party in pursuing arbitration hearings in connection with a mechanic's lien
foreclosure where requested, Gallachers failed to cite to the lower court one case or other
6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ai ith 3i it; for a c: ontrary position, hul I'laimcd (ki( deGroot was attempting to amend, the
Arbitral

• -

deG; .1. - va- attempting tu dc was lo have die trial court award attorneys fees pursuant to
Sec 38-1-1* TTtnh Code An- d*

J

'-\

. -

: ill-- "nadvertent language in an arbitrator's
.: ~uru auorne) s fees in accordance with the law

and not a pronouncement by the arbitr
decide the issue of attorneys fees or to rule that both parties were to bear their own attonieys
fees, because the w ritten agreement signed by the parties submitting this matter to arbitration
h

HL, t-v

'

"

'

"I* <

n.inhL ulelifoot s stalulon tight t o a

nicwlianic s lien and die p o w u o i a com i under the iiiechiiiiit s lien sl.ilulcs lo AW mil (ilnm in \ •
fees. T h e law is clear that an arbitrator does not have the authority t o rule "upon issues not
given lo the arbitrator in a signed written agreement, See Orton, SuprafR. 113-101). .
In t h e hem (tit.1 »»d ddpMiof ^ scioii'll molion i»» «« sponsc lo (iallacher

MHIOM IOI

attorneys fees, in response to Gallachers' argument that deGroot was attempting .
the arbitration award, the court found and ruled:
" j ' v e never heard Mr. McCoy come in here and argue about the underlying
award. It's very much the interplay of the mechanics lien statute which I
think is a very legitimate legal point. So when I read, it's hard to imagine an
award that would run afoul. I think they're saying it's an abuse of discretion
standard and we don^t think (inaudible) 10 abuse that discretion: but we don';
••; realK prevailing p.*
* ' ^ . ^ M C more arguing a prevailing part\
unless you "re arguing als< :uij Unit m uidinon."(emphasis added* j
transcript Wil 18 700? Appendix i . Appellanrs brief)
ail( j

furtjler^

as

i0 b a ( j faith, at p I >' i il llir same Iransi i ipl

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"THE COURT: I do understand the argument Mr. Call but I think this is in
many ways,firstimpression. I can certainly notfindbad faith and I think it's
a very reasonable argument that the mechanics lien has some independent
enforceability here. I disagreed with it. It's applicability except if there's
further action under the lien once we have an arbitration award. But the first
time you were up here the arbitrator really hadn't addressed the issue. The
second time. I think he did a very good job and I certainly agree with what he
said but I do not find a basis for fees. I find that the statute is discretionary
and the Court's discretion is appropriately exersized in this case by
confirming the award and yet again, if I need to, but not awarding fees either
way. That will be the order.femphasis added¥Op.Cit.p. 15)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
DeGroot has consistently taken the position that by signing an arbitration agreement
which does not mention mechanics liens or the attorneys fees provided thereunder, it did not
waive its statutory rights tofilea mechanics lien and proceed to collect the money due, plus
attorneys fees. While Utah has not ruled on this issue, other states courts have ruled that the
attorneys fees necessary to determine the amount due a claimant in arbitration is a necessary
part of the mechanics lien foreclosure procedure and are assessable as costs to the prevailing
party under the statutory procedures for mechanics liens.

8
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an arbitration in order to arrive at the sum owed to the claimant in order to complete the
mechanics lien foreclosure proceeding.(R.110).

Gallacher, in their memorandum in

opposition to this motion, argue only the language of Sec. 78-3 la-15(1) Utah Code Ann.>
and the terms of the contract, neither of which deal with the issue of mechanics liens and
the attorneys fees provided thereunder, to argue that deGroot waived his rights to a
mechanics lien and the attorneys fees therein provided by signing an agreement that never
mentions in any way, any such issues. Never once in any of the memos in the lower court,
did Gallachers cite any case lawfromUtah or any other jurisdiction which held that such a
contract waived the contractors statutory lien rights and attorney fees. In addition, on this
appeal, no case authority is cited by Gallacherfromany jurisdiction ruling in their favor that
an arbitration agreement totally silent as to attorneys fees or mechanics liens bars a claimant
from asking the court to award the fees provided for by mechanics lien statutes, where the
claimant has perfected its lien and is the prevailing party.
The ruling of the lower court (P.13, Tr., April 18, 2002, also at Appendix F,
Appellant's brief) shows what it thought of the issues raised by the parties. Essentially, it
had heard deGroot's arguments, Gallacher9 s arguments, and found that deGroot's counsel
had never argued "about the underlying award" as Gallacher claims. The court went on:
"It is very much the interplay of the mechanics lien statute which I think is a very legitimate
legal point." It is obvious from this ruling that the lower court never felt that deGroot's
motions were, in any way, an attack upon the Arbitration award, as Gallacher argued then
and now on this appeal. The court went on at p. 15 of this transcript, tofindno Bad Faith on
10
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had not properly dealt with attorneys fees upon the first motion; the Arbitration award had
to be clarified. Upon the clarification, the second motion asked for attorneys fees to be
awarded upon the basis of the mechanics lien statute, not modification of the arbitration
award, which motion was denied by the lower court. There was no bad faith to be found
upon these facts. The Arbitration statute is purely discretionary as to awarding attorneys
fees for either party, and the lower court exercised its discretion and awarded neither party
attorneys fees. Cross- Appellants have shown no valid reason in fact or law to overturn the
decision of the lower court.
Dated this 30th day of June, 2003.
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No..
JOHN L. MCCOY (2164)
Attorney for Plaintiff
10 W. Broadway, Suite #310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-6400
FAX NO.:
(801) 596-2336

FILED
AUG * 8 2001
By.

iniro ui*tHwi wourt

£b

Deputy Clerk, Summit County

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAUL deGROOT BUILDING SERVICES,
LLC,
Plaintiff ,
vs.
RICHARD T. GALLACHER and R.T.
GALLACHER INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants.

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT BASED ON ARBITRATION AWARD AND MOTION
TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES
CIVIL NO. 000600252
JUDGE:

Hilder

The plaintiff moves the Court pursuant to Section 7831a-15 U.C.A.,

to make findings as to which party was the

'"successful party'' in the arbitration below and make a finding as
to the reasonable fees to be awarded pursuant to Section 38-1-18
U.C.A, or remand this case to the arbitrator to make findings
pursuant to Section 38-1-18 U.C.A.,

as to which party was the

successful party in the arbitration and to receive further
evidence as to the amount of attorney fees of the successful
party and make findings as to what should be a reasonable
attorneys fee in this matter.
This motion is based upon the Memorandum of Law

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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attached hereto.
DATED this

) ' day of August, 2001
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V
JOHN L. McCOY (2164)
Attorney for Plaintiff
10 W. Broadway, Suite #310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-6400
FAX NO.:
(801) 596-2336

Fiki

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAUL deGROOT BUILDING SERVICES,
LLC,
Plaintiff , :
vs.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

:

RICHARD T. GALLACHER and R.T.
GALLACHER INVESTMENTS, LLC,

:

Defendants. :

CIVIL NO. 000600252
JUDGE:

Hilder

FACTS:
1.

This action is a mechanics lien action based upon

§38-1-1 et. seq., U.C.A.,

the defendants moved for arbitration

in accordance with paragraph 15.8 of the AIA contract between the
parties and this Court ordered arbitration.
2.

The plaintiff had filed this action for the total

sum of $9,881.83, interest at 10% per annum, also for attorney
fees and costs of court to be taxed as costs to the successful
party pursuant to Section 38-1-18 U.C.A.
3*

After a plenary arbitration hearing of a day and

one-half, the arbitrator found in favor of the plaintiff on the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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9

merits of this claim and that the defendants owed the plaintiff
the sum of $8,636.43, plus interest at 10% upon a claim asserted
at arbitration of about $10,000.00. The arbitrator found that
the defendants owed plaintiff about 86% of the
4.

original claim.

The only claims the defendants succeeded on at

arbitration were minor construction deficiencies corrected by
defendants' own subcontractors.
5.

Thus, it is clear in this case, based upon the

findings of fact by the arbitrator, as to the factual and legal
issues, that the plaintiff succeeded on 86% of its claim.

The

plaintiff was the "successful party" in the arbitration below,
and is now asking this Court to enter a judgment and decree of
foreclosure as originally requested in its complaint.
6.

The plaintiff, as the successful party, under

Section 38-1-18 U.C.A., mechanics lien law is entitled to
reasonable attorneys fees as a matter of law to be taxed as costs
in this action.
7.

The arbitrator made no finding that either party

was the successful party in the arbitration; but ruled that each
party should bear its own attorneys fees.
8.

The arbitrator may have regarded an the award of

attorneys fees as beyond his powers, as the contract providing
for arbitration made no provision for attorney fees.
9.

The arbitrator made to findings as to the contract

rate of interest provided by the contract; despite the clear fact
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•

that the contract (exhibit 1) signed by the parties provided at
Article 9.2 that interest "as noted on bottom of invoice" would
be charged on payments due and unpaid.
10.

The invoices sent thereafter to the defendants all

had the following language at the bottom:
M

terms: invoices are due and payable upon receipt
invoices not paid within the days after date of invoice
will be charged 2.5% per month interest."
11. Instead of making any findings as to the above
subject matter, the arbitrator simply found that the interest
rate on the money found due upon these invoices was 10 % rather
than the contract rate to which the parties had agreed.
ARGUMENT:
ATTORNEY FEES:
Section 38-1-18, U.C.A., provides that in any action
brought to foreclose a mechanics lien,

...MXthe successful party

shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys fee to be
fixed by the Court, which shall be taxed as costs in the
action.'"

(Emphasis added).
The arbitrator found at page 2 of his findings that the

parties stipulated that the claimant (deGroot) timely recorded
the mechanics lien and that a copy was sent to the respondents
(Gallacher) pursuant to law.
Plaintiff proceeded to prove its case before the
arbitrator and on an approximate claim of $10,000.00, the
arbitrator awarded deGroot the sum of $8,636.43 by detailed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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w
findings.
In any event, deGroot (plaintiff) was awarded roughly
85% of the amount originally claimed.

The terms of Section 38-1-

18, U.C.A., are clear and are mandatory in that a "successful
party shall" (emphasis added) be awarded attorneys fees by the
Court to be taxed as costs.
Perhaps it was the language "by the court" which caused
the arbitrator not to rule on this issue.

In addition, these

fees by statute are to be assessed as costs, not ordinarily done
by an arbitrator, but usually awarded by a court pursuant to the
terms of the statute.
This case is not a complicated case, as can be seen
from the arbitrator's findings and counsel's affidavit for
attorneys fees. Plaintiff believes that findings can be made
therefrom that the plaintiff was the successful party and that
those fees totaling $7,385.00 shall be taxed as costs.
The attorneys fees are a substantial factor in this
case; however, the defendant by his choice of insisting on
arbitration and the relentless defense of this matter, has caused
the plaintiff to incur these fees.

When such is the case, the

prevailing party is entitled to those fees reasonably incurred,
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken,

764 P.d. 985 (Utah 1988).

While it may be argued that the arbitration award
should not be modified, the arbitrator never made a finding as to
who was the successful party under Section 38-1-18, U.C.A.
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It is

necessary in a mechanics lien that such a finding be made,
"Parties contemplating arbitration must be
assured that the arbitrator will proceed according
to established standards... a policy that refuses
to overturn an arbitration award that has clearly
departed from governing standards established at
the outset will in the long run simply discourage
other prospective litigants from submitting their
disputes to arbitration." Pacific Development v.
Orton, 420 UAR 3 2001 Ut. 36 (Utah 01).
If this court does not feel that making findings
pursuant Section 38-1-18 is proper for this court, then this
court should remand this matter to the arbitrator who heard this
matter to make findings of which party was the successful party
and to receive evidence as to the amount of attorneys fees
incurred by the successful party and the reasonableness of those
fees pursuant to Section 38-1-18, U.C.A.
INTEREST:
For some unexplained reason, the arbitrator made no
findings as to the contract rate of interest, but simply made the
finding the plaintiff was only entitled to interest at the rate
of 10% per annum.
Utah law, for many years has provided that the parties
to a contract may agree to a rate of interest.

Section 15-1-1,

U.C.A. provides:
M

(l) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon
any rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of
their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a
different rate of interest, the legal rate of interest
for the loan or forebearance of any money, goods or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In this case, it was undisputed that the parties signed
a contract which referred to the plaintiff's invoice as to the
rate of interest for unpaid invoices.

It was further undisputed

that the defendant received these invoices thereafter without
objection as to the interest rate expressed thereon, and that the
rate of interest on all of those invoices was 2.5% per month.
There are no findings that the above method of
referring to another document was incorrect, nor should any such
finding be made as our Supreme Court has ruled that the
establishment of interest rates by reference is legal and should
be upheld, Zions First National Bank v Rocky Mountain Irr, 931
P2d 142,(Utah 1997).

Indeed it is not unusual today to have a

contract or promisory note refer to a rate or an interest index
as to the rate of interest.
It is the plaintiff's position that the rate of
interest as to the unpaid invoices referred to in the
arbitrator's findings and the amounts of interest due upon
plainiff's invoices found to be unpaid by the arbitrator are
mathematical computations and can be done by this court.
However, if the court wishes, this issue, also can be referred
back to the arbitrator to make further findings as to whether or
not the contract signed by the parties provides as set forth
above and the rate of interest shown upon the invoices was.
However, plaintiff believes that there is no dispute of fact that
the contract was signed and that it refers to the invoices for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the rate of interest and that the invoices provide for 2.5% per
month.

Still such a decision is up to the court, as the

arbitrator failed to make findings on this issue and such
findings are necessary to clarify a part of the award as set
forth in (c) of Section 78-31a-13 or any of the grounds set forth
in Section 78-31a-15.
SUMMARY
As set forth in the Orton case, Supra., for the
arbitration system to work, established standards must be
followed.

The right to have findings made as to who was the

successful party, and the enforcement of the plain terms of a
signed agreement between the parties are a part of those
standards.

These deviations from those requirements must be

corrected by this court or remanded to the arbitrator for
correction.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2001.
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JOHN L. McCOY (2164)
Attorney for Plaintiff
10 W. Broadway, Suite #310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-6400
FAX NO.:
(801) 596-2336

By__J^O/str/c* Court

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAUL deGROOT BUILDING SERVICES,
:
LLC,
Plaintiff , :
vs.

:

RICHARD T. GALLACHER and R.T.
GALLACHER INVESTMENTS, LLC.,

:
:

Defendants. :

REPLY MEMORANDUM
OF PLAINTIFF

CIVIL NO. 000600252
JUDGE:

Hilder

DeGroot replies to defendants opposition memorandum as
follows:
At arbitration, the only document providing for
arbitration before the arbitrator was the agreement of May 24,
1999, between the parties agreeing to arbitration.

This

agreement which is attached to plaintiff's motion for judgment
and for attorneys fees herein, made no provision as to attorneys
fees.

Plaintiff believes that this is the reason that the

arbitrator found that both parties would bear their own attorneys
fees, as the agreement was silent as to that issue.

The power of

an arbitrator is limited by the agreement providing for
arbitration.

Buzas v. Salt Lake Baseball, 925 P2d 941 (Ut 1996),

Swift Industries, Inc. v. Botany Industries, 466 F 2d 1125, 1131

1
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(3rd Cir. 1972), thus, it is apparent that the arbitrator had no
power to award attorneys fees.
More importantly, Gallacher makes the argument that
because the matter of attorneys fees was submitted by the parties
to the arbitrator, that such action,

indeed placed the matter of

attorney fees before the arbitrator.

The Orton case cited in the

memorandum of plaintiff was accepted for certiorari by the Utah
Supreme Court, and on appeal, the Court reversed that part of the
decision by the Court of Appeals that the arbitration agreement
could be modified and expanded by the parties by bringing in
evidence outside the scope of the arbitration agreement.

On the

contrary, the Court held that an arbitration agreement cannot be
so modified except by a written agreement signed by the parties
explicitly so providing.

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of

Appeals and held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when
he dealt with issues and evidence not covered by the original
agreement of the parties. A copy of the case is attached for the
convenience of the court.
In the instant case, attorneys fees are not provided
for in the original agreement between the parties, thus any
reference to them by the arbitrator was beyond the powers of the
arbitrator, and the fact that the parties orally submitted the
matter of attorneys fees to the arbitrator did not expand the
jurisdiction as to attorney fees beyond the time of the written

2
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agreement signed by the parties,

Pacific Development v. Qrton,

420 UAR 3 (UT 2001).
The arbitrator never made a finding as to who was the
"successful party", under Utah Mechanics lien law, but awarded
the plaintiff approximately 85% on the merits of its original
claim.

The only claim of defendants allowed by the arbitrator

was an offset of $745.90. Utah case law is consistent in granting
attorneys fees in mechanics lien cases to either party who
succeeds on the merits of their case.
Kurzet,

876 P2d 421 (Ut App 1994).

Bailey-Allen Co. Inc. v.

The Court of Appeals in

Kurzet reversed the trial court denial of attorney fees as an
abuse of discretion and remanded for a determination of the
amount of those fees under the guidelines established in Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P2d at p. 989, as the plaintiff has
asked this court to determine fees in the instant case.
How could reasonable minds differ as to whether deGroot
was successful on the merits of this claim?

The defendant in

Bailey-Allen, Supra, only won a dismissal of a mechanics lien and
bond law claim and nothing more, yet it was a breach of
discretion under Utah law for the trial court to not award the
defendant attorneys fees.

For an example of how successful

deGroot was, page 11 of Gallacher's counsel's closing memorandum
to the arbitrator is attached hereto showing that if the
arbitrator found for Gallacher on all of the claims presented,

3
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Gallacher would still owe deGroot the sum of $832.47. Yet,
nowhere in these proceedings or in the arbitration did Gallacher
make any offer of settlement or motion to enter judgment in favor
of deGroot for any sum whatsoever. Instead Gallacher fought this
claim every step of the way and even though his own calculations
show that he owed deGroot money on this job, Gallacher now claims
that no liability exists as to the defendants for the attorneys
fees necessary to bring this case to a conclusion,

despite the

fact that the entitlement to such fees is clearly and mandatorily
set forth by statute.
Defendants argue that the relief sought by plaintiff in
its motion is beyond the powers of this Court under Section 7831a-14(l)(c).

Under the ruling in Orton, such is simply not the

case. Just the opposite is true; that the arbitrator exceeded his
powers under Section 78-31a-14 to rule on attorneys fees because
the arbitration agreement of the parties made no provision for
such fees.

On the other hand, Section 38-1-18, U.C.A., provides

that this court, not some other finder of fact shall award
attorneys fees to the successful party to be taxed as costs.
This procedure has been followed before by a Utah Court
under arbitration.

See Cellcom v. Systems Communication

Corp., 939 P2d 185 (Utah App. 1997) where an arbitration
agreement did deal with attorneys fees, but the parties never
followed that agreement, instead the claimant filed a mechanics
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lien and claimed attorney fees under Section 38-1-18 and the
Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court for a determination
of those fees under Section 38-1-18 U.C.A.
In fact, it appears that Section 78-31a-15 U.C.A is
closer to providing the court with the powers to deal with this
situation where it provides a court with the power to modify an
arbitration award where:
"(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a matter not
submitted to them, if the award can be corrected
without affecting the merits of the award upon the
issues submitted/"
Under the holding and rule in Orton, the issue of
attorneys fees was not properly before the arbitrator in the
instant case because the agreement was silent.

It is obvious

that the award can be corrected without affecting the merits of
the portion of the award correctly submitted to the arbitrator.
However, other states, with similar arbitration
statutes to Utah have concluded that where an arbitration
agreement in fact provided for attorneys fees to the "prevailing
party", and the arbitration award found on the merits against a
claimant, but found that the parties should bear their own
attorneys fees, that such a finding was error under a Washington
statute which provided as follows:
"In any of the following cases the court shall
after notice and hearing make an order vacating
the award, upon the application of any party to
the arbitration:

5
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"The policy which encourages arbitration would be
undermined if contracting parties perceived that
lawful contractual provisions, negotiated and
expressly agreed upon, could be ignored by the
arbitration tribunal."
Moreover, Lacey regarded the right of a prevailing
party to attorneys fees a serious right of a party to which the
arbitrator had been ordered to address and had ignored, that the
court ordered that a new arbitrator be appointed, (p.716)
The Lacey court then vacated the lower court
affirmance of the arbitrator award that each party bear its own
attorneys fees and remanded the case with directions to the lower
court to choose a new arbitrator for the determination of the
amount of attorneys fees.
Gallacher argueS that Buzas v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925
P2d 941 (Utah 1996) supports their position that the arbitrators
award cannot be changed by this court; however, at p. 947, the
Buzas court, citing previous Utah cases, cites the general rule
that an arbitration award will not be disturbed by a court "as
long as the proceeding was fair and honest and the substantial
rights of the parties were respected". (Emphasis added).

The

right of a successful party to attorney fees mandated by a
statute is one of those "substantial rights", see Kurzet Supra.
Furthermore at p. 950 the Buzas court observed the rule that an
arbitrator may be found to have exceeded his authority if the
award is "without foundation in reason and fact,"

sometimes

7
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referred to as the "irrationality principle."

The court cited

with approval an Alaska case defining the irrationality principle
as "whether reasonable minds could agree that ... [the award] was
not possible under a fair interpretation of the evidence."
Anchorage Medical Clinic v. James, 555 P2d 1320, 1323 (Alaska
1976) (ID. p. 950).
Thus, it is apparent that the arbitrator in the instant
case did not have the power to award or not award attorneys fees
to either party under the contract providing for arbitration.
There is no doubt that deGroot was the successful party on the
merits of this case before the arbitrator and that Section 38-11., U.C.A. provides that in such a case, this court shall award
the successful party attorneys fees to be taxed as costs.
INTEREST:
The only invoices in the record in the arbitration
hearing were invoices bearing the rate of 2.5% per month.
DeGroot has never made any claim for the service charges or
transaction fees.

The fact that deGroot may have sent invoices

to Gallacher's lender who was not a party to the agreement should
affect the contract of the parties which was clear that
statements not paid would bear interest as set forth on the
invoices. The invoices submitted in evidence provided for 2.5%
interest per month. A copy of invoice R-6 is attached for the
court's examination.

The rate of interest specified in a

8
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contract should be awarded as a matter of right, 45 AM Jur 2d 43,
Section 21.

It is simply not rational to, in a cost plus

contract to put upon a contractor the burden of promptly paying
his workers, suppliers and subcontractors and where the contract
refers to the invoices and the interest rate of 2.5% per month is
placed on the invoices sent to the owner, to change that rate to
10% because a bank who had the construction loan, not a party to
the contract, was sent invoices which were silent as to the
interest rate.
SUMMARY:
The Courts have a vested interest in seeing to it that
the law is in fact followed by arbitrators.

If the substantial

statutory or contract right of parties can be totally ignored by
an arbitrator, parties will refuse to arbitrate, thus causing
increased burdens on the court system.
Attorneys fees and the contractual rate of interest are
provided for by Utah law.

These are substantial rights and not

subject to being ignored by trial courts or arbitrators.

The

court has the power to enforce those rights without disturbing
the merits of the arbitrator's award.
DATED this 20th day of August, 2001.

.ttorney for

C/
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT, L.C.,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
Eric ORTON, dba Orton Excavation,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 990744
FILED: 04/24/01
2001 UT36
Fourth District, Utah County
The Honorable Steven L. Hansen
ATTORNEYS:
Scott L. Wiggins, Mark E. Arnold, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff
Richard D. Bradford, Kim H. Buhler, Provo, for
defendant
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
DURRANT, Justice:
^[1 We granted a writ of certiorari to review a court
of appeals decision affirming the district court's
confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Orton
Excavation. Orton served as a subcontractor on a real
estate project developed by Pacific Development,
L.C. A dispute arose over the amount Pacific owed
Orton for work performed, and the parties entered
into a written arbitration agreement that described the
scope of their dispute by reference to a single plat of
land. The arbitrator made rulings with respect to two
plats of land upon which Orton had performed work.
Orton sought confirmation of the award in the district
court, and Pacific filed a motion to vacate or modify
the award on the ground that the arbitrator had
exceeded his authority by ruling on both plats and
had manifestly disregarded legal authority pertaining
to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit
in the contract. The district court confirmed the
award, and Pacific appealed on the same grounds it
had raised before the arbitrator and the district court.
The court of appeals affirmed. We affirm in part and
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

over a Mechanics' Lien filed against
Riderwood Village, Plats B & C . . . . [The
parties] acknowledge that the issues relating
to the above-referenced Plat B of Riderwood
Village have been resolved, and that,
I
therefore, the arbitration will focus on the
remaining issues of the dispute, those which
relate to Plat C, thereby resolving all
remaining issues in the case.
The arbitration took place in 1997. Despite the
language stating that only Plat C issues remained

unresolved, both parties presented some evidence
relating to Plat B. The arbitrator rendered an interim
decision with respect to both Plat B and Plat C.
Pacific moved for reconsideration, arguing that the
arbitrator had exceeded his authority by deciding Plat
B issues and by failing to apply the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in his Plat C decision. The
arbitrator supplemented and clarified the reasoning
supporting his decision but ultimately rejected
Pacific's motion and issued a final arbitration award
relating to both plats.
1[3 Orton sought confirmation of the arbitrator's
award in the district court pursuant to Section
78-3 la-12 of the Utah Code. Pacific responded by
filing a motion to vacate or modify the award. Pacific
argued that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority
by including Plat B in the award. Pacific also argued
that the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law
by refusing to apply the doctrine of good faith and
fair dealing to offset Orton's purportedly excessive
use of fill material in its work on Plat C.
^[4 The district court rejected these arguments and
confirmed the arbitrator's award. Pacific appealed,
renewing the arguments it had presented to the district
court. The court of appeals affirmed. See Pacific Dev..
L.C. v. Orion, 1999 UT App 217,1|20, 982 P.2d 94.
With respect to Pacific's claim that the arbitrator
exceeded the scope of his authority, the court of
appeals reasoned that Pacific and Orton, by "their
conduct and mutual consent, submitted Plat B issues
for resolution, expanding the scope of the arbitrator's
jurisdiction." Id. ^[12. The court of appeals also
rejected Pacific's contention that the arbitrator had
manifestly disregarded the law by refusing to apply
an offset based on the doctrine of good faith and fair
dealing. See id. 1J16.
I
ANALYSIS
T|5 On certiorari, Pacific renews the arguments it
presented unsuccessfully to the district court and the
court of appeals. Specifically, Pacific maintains that
(1) the arbitrator improperly ruled upon a dispute that

Pacific Development v. Orton
420 Utah Adv. Rep. 3

court faced with a motion to vacate or modify an
arbitration award is limited to determining whether
any of the very limited grounds for modification or
vacatur exist." Id. at 947. On appeal, the appellate
court should '"grant no deference to the district court's
conclusions [of law] but review them for
correctness.'" Id. at 948 (alteration in original)
(quoting Devore v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d
1246, 1251 (Utah 1994)). On certiorari, we likewise
review the decision of the court of appeals for
correctness, but further limit our review to the scope
of the issues considered by the court of appeals. See
Wall, 1999 UT 33, f4, 978 P.2d 460.
1)7 Orton brought its action for confirmation of the
award in the district court pursuant to the Utah
Arbitration Act, Section 78-3la-12 of that Act
requires the court to "confirm the award unless a
motion is timely filed to vacate or modify the award."
Pacific timely moved, under Section 78-3 3 a-14( 1), to
modify or vacate the portion of the arbitrator's award
pertaining to PlatB. Section 78-31 a-14(1) in pertinent
part provides: "Upon motion to the court by any party
to the arbitration proceeding for vacation of the
award, the court shall vacate the award if it appears:
. . . (c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers . . . ."2
Both of Pacific's arguments rely upon this ground as
a basis for overturning the arbitrator's decision.3 We
address them in the order stated above.
I. THE ARBITRATOR'S CONSIDERATION
OF PLAT B ISSUES
1J8 The written arbitration agreement provided that
"[the parties] acknowledge that the issues relating to
the above- referenced Plat B of Riderwood Village
have been resolved, and that, therefore, the arbitration
will focus on the remaining issues of the dispute,
those which relate to Plat C, thereby resolving all
remaining issues in the case." In other words,
payments for Plat B were not in dispute and, once the
issues relating to Plat C had been resolved, all
disputes would be at an end. The only reasonable
interpretation of the agreement is that Plat B issues
would not be submitted for resolution by the
arbitrator.
T|9 We have previously held that only written
arbitration agreements are enforceable under the Act.
See Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796,799-800 (Utah
1998).4 Further, the written agreement defines the
scope of the arbitrator's authority. "An arbitration
award purporting to resolve questions beyond [the]
jurisdictional boundary [of the agreement] is not
valid. For a court to find that an arbitrator has
exceeded his or her delegated authority, the court
must determine that 'the arbitrator's award covers
areas not contemplated by the submission
agreement."' Intermountain Power v. Union Pacific
R.R., 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998) (quoting Buzas
Baseball, 925 P.2d at 949). As noted above, the
arbitration agreement in this case limited the
arbitrator's authority to issuing an award for the Plat
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presented evidence relating to Plat B for the sole
purpose of establishing a course of dealing relevant to
Pacific's arguments concerning its Plat C evidence.
Orton responds that Pacific opened the door to Plat B
issues and that Pacific's own evidence made clear that
Plat B issues were in dispute. Orton thus contends
that the parties' course of conduct at the arbitration
hearing invited and necessitated a modification in the
scope of that hearing. Neither party alleges an express
agreement to modify the hearing, either orally or in
writing The issue we must resolve, nen, is the \tvt\
of proof necessary to demonstrate a mutual decision
by the parties to modify the scope of the arbitration
originally established by a formal written agreement
to arbitrate. The court of appeals held that the initial
written agreement could be modified by implication,
that is, by the conduct of the parties^in presenting
evidence relating to a dispute outside the scope of the
initial agreement. See Orton, 1999 UT App 217,
^12-13,^982 P.2d 94. We disagree.
1[il
Notwithstanding the fact that an arbitration
agreement is, in its essence, a contract between the
parties, it is governed by a statute that imposes
requirements not found in ordinary common law
contracts. As prior cases make clear, arbitration
agreements, unlike ordinary contracts, must be
contained in a written document setting forth the
scope of the dispute to be arbitrated. See Percival,
962 P.2d at 799-800 (holding agreement must be in
writing to be enforceable under the Act);
Intermountain Power, 961 P.2d at 323 (holding
arbitrator's authority limited by scope of arbitration
agreement); Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 949 (same).
This requirement at once enhances predictability and
seeks to ensure that the parties are deliberately
waiving their substantial rights to judicial review. It
also seeks to relieve the parties and the judiciary of
the burden of revisiting disputes that have been
submitted to binding arbitration.
\\2
In this regard, we have frequently stated that
the goal of the Act is to encourage extra-judicial
settlement of legal disputes. As observed in Buzas
Baseball"'the Utah Arbitration Act 'reflects
long-standing public policy favoring speedy and
inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes.'" 925
P.2d at 946 (quoting Allred v. Educators Mut. Ins.
Ass'n, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996)); see also
Intermountain Power, 961 P.2d at 323. That policy,
however, would not be furthered by a doctrine that
simply seeks to affirm the maximum possible number
of arbitration awards. Parties contemplating
arbitration must be assured that the arbitration will
[to established standards that both
sides (jelrffto^ fair and j ust. To ^he extent rules that
govjeTn^
TusceptfBTeTio"contested fnterpretationrthe policy of
promoting arbitration will be advanced because there
will be fewer opportunities to contest an arbitrator's
award at the district r.nnrt nr thp o^oiiofo u,r~i A
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Pacific Development v. Orton
420 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
that Pacific had not met its burden of proving
arbitration award itself and the memorandum of
Orton wasted material. Without a factual
agreement which binds the parties and limits the
basis for Pacific's allegation, the arbitrator
scope of issues to be determined by the arbitration."
925 P.2d at 946 n.2. Accordingly, the rules governing
found no support for Pacific's argument that
the__arbitration proceeding must be^sjiffident in
Orton had breached its implied duty of good
-'Themselves to provide the evidence necessary foFa
faith. Thus, we conclude the arbitrator did not
court to either confirm, modify, or vacate an
manifestly disregard the law.
^itraloj^'award puTsuanTto the statute.
Orton, 1999 UT App 217, «!16, 982 P.2d 94.
fl3
TEe scope of the arbitration is a governing H16
We agree. A party is not entitled to review of
standard that is fundamental to the expectations of the the correctness of an arbitrator's legal reasoning.
parties to the arbitration. The parties must know the ,,:[M]anifest disregard' is much more than mere error
boundaries of the subject rnattei of the dispute as to the law." Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 951. Wc
submitted and the potential liabilities flowing therefore affirm the court of appeals on this issue.
therefrom before they are able to intelligently waive
CONCLUSION
their rights to submit their disputes to formal 1117
We reverse the court of appeals' holding that
litigation. And because the authority of the arbitrator the scope of the arbitration agreement was modified
derives from the arbitration agreement itself, see to include Plat B issues. The Plat B dispute was
Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 949, it follows that the beyond the scope of the arbitration as set forth in the
scope of an agreement to arbitrate cannot be modified written agreement, and the parties executed no written
except by proper concurrence of the parties to the modification of that agreement. We affirm the court
arbitration.
of appeals' holding affirming the district court's
f14
The court of appeals concluded that a wri tten confirmation of the arbitrator's award as to the Plat C
arbitration agreement may be implicitly modified- dispute. Pacific's claim that the arbitrator manifestly
merely"by the paTtielTactions in bringing evidencToT disregarded the law is merely an attempt to obtain
matters outside the scopeofjhe agreement. We review of the arbitrator's factual findings on thai
disagree. The decision ot the court of appeals is issue. We remand for modification of the arbitrator's
"contrary to the statutory criteria governing arbitration award in a manner consistent with this opinion. As to
and to our decisions construing those criteria. Where Orton's claim for attorney fees, on remand, the district
the statute and our case law have held that arbitration court has discretion to award Orton attorney fees for
agreements must be in writing, the preference for an defense of its action at all court levels, but only with
explicit expression of the intent of the parties respect to Orton's defense of the portion of the award
regarding the scope of arbitration is well-established. pertaining to Plat C. See Utah Code Ann. §78-31 a-16;
To allow modification of an express written Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 953-54.
agreement by less than a similarly explicit intent H18
Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice
would simply circumvent the statutory requirements Russon, Justice Durham, and Judge Halliday concur
and the policies they vindicate. In this case, no in Justice Durrant's opinion.
express written agreement to modify the scope of the Tf 19
Having disqualified himself, Justice Wilkins
arbitration has been alleged, let alone proven. We does not participate herein; District Judge Bruce K.
therefore reverse and hold that the arbitrator exceeded Halliday sat
the authority granted to him when he issued an award
for Plat B.
1 Apparently, the underlying contract between the parties
II. PACIFIC'S CONTENTION THAT THE
ARBITRATOR'S AWARD DEMONSTRATED required them to arbitrate disputes. This fact was mentioned
in oral argument, although neither party has provided an
A MANIFEST DISREGARD FOR
addendum of the relevant contract provision nor cited to
APPLICABLE LAW
any portion of the record where it may be found.
1) 15
Pacific also asserts that the arbitrator
2 The full text of the provision reads as follows:
manifestly disregarded the law by refusing to apply
Upon motion to the court by any party to the
an offset pursuant to the implied covenant of good
arbitration proceeding for vacation of the award,
faith and fair dealing in its contract with Orton. The
the court shall vacate the award if it appears:
contract provided for unit price billing for fill
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
other undue means; (b) an arbitrator, appointed as
materials. Pacific claims that Orton violated the
neutral, showed partiality, or an arbitrator was
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by using too
guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of
much fill material in its work on Plat C, and that the
any party; (c) the arbitrators exceeded their
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law pertaining to
powers; (d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the
this covenant. However, the arbitrator's decision
hearing upon sufficient cause shown, refused to
explicitly addressed the covenant of good faith and
hear evidence material to the controversy, or
fair dealing and found that Pacific had failed to meet
otherwise conducted the hearing to the substantial
its burden of proof in showing that Orton had
prejudice of the rights of a party; or (e) there was
no arbitration agreement between thenarties t.n the.
manifested bad faith in its use of rill materials Thp
Code-Co
Provo, Utah
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Bluth v. Tax Commission
420 Utah Adv. Rep. 6

Code-Co
Provo, Utah

parties. See /(/.Similar in nature is the claim, considered in
BACKGROUND
other cases buTnot presented here, that an arbitrator's \2 Pursuant to authority granted under Utah Code
"clecisionTacks any basis in reason or fact and is therefore
Ann. §§59-1- 210, -12-118 (2000), the Commission
"completely irrational." See id. at 95U; lntermouniain Power
vrVmoh Pacific R.R., 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998). has promulgated rules relating to provisions of the
While both arguments presented in this case turn on Sales and Use Tax Act (Sales Tax Act). See Utah
whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority, we will Code Ann, §§59-12-101 to -1302 (2000). Acting
emplovthe shorthand term "manifestdisregard" to'refeTto pursuant to two such rules, Utah Code Admin. P.
Facitic's argument relating to good faithand fair dealing. R865-19S-33, -62, the Commission directed that
4"!he result in Jenkins was somewhat complex. Justice amounts paid for annual memberships to discount
Stewart's lead opinion stated that although an oral vendors such as Costco and Sam's Club are taxable
agreement could not be enforced under the Act, eouity under the Sales Tax Act. See Utah Tax Bulletin 33-94
might nonetheless provide a separate ground for
enforcement. See 962 P.2d at 801-02. Justice Zimmerman (1994). Vendor members are allowed to purchase
concurred separately, stating that the law should not be taxable property or services at a discounted rate from
"hostile to the enforcement of oral arbitration agreements the vendor. Appellants are members of either Costco
made as part of a larger oral contract." See id. at 802. or Sam's Club and have paid sales tax on their annual
Nonetheless, a majority of the members of the court clearly membership fees.
held that only written agreements were enforceable under 1(3 Appellants, as class representatives in a class
the Act. See id. at 799-800 (Stewart, J...joined by Durham, action lawsuit, filed a declaratory judgment action in
J.); id. at 803 (Russon, J., joined by Howe, C.J., dissenting district court to challenge the legality of R865-19S-33
from result allowing potential enforcement of oral
agreement to arbitrate at equity, but concurring in holding and R865-19S-62 of the Utah Administrative Code.
that written agreement is required under the Act). The Appellants contended the membership fees are not
dispute in Jenkins over equitable enforcement is not taxable under Utah Code Ann. §§59-12-102,
implicated in this case, as Orton argues only pursuant to the -103(l)(a), (f) (2000). Upon a motion by the
Arbitration Act.
Commission, the trial court dismissed Appellants'
complaint after deciding that it did not have subject
matter jurisdiction because Article XIII, Section 11 of
the Utah Constitution gives the Commission original
Cite as
jurisdiction.
420 Utah Adv. Rep. 6
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
f4 The issue before us is whether the trial court
IN THE
properly dismissed Appellants' complaint for lack of
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
subject matter jurisdiction. We review the trial court's
Tyler W. BLUTH and Heidi T. Orme, husband determination for correctness. See Schwenke v. Smith,
and wife; Michael Vail, an individual; and Peter 942 P.2d 335, 336 (Utah 1997).
ANALYSIS
Wimbrow, an individual, on behalf of themselves
15 Article XIII, Section ll(3)(a) of the Utah
and all others similarly situated,
Constitution states: "The State Tax Commission shall
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
administer and supervise the tax laws of the State."
TAX COMMISSION,
Id. A limitation on the Commission's power is
Defendant and Appellee.
contained in Article XIII, Section 11(5) of the Utah
Constitution, which states:
No. 20000183-CA
Notwithstanding the powers granted to the
FILED: 04/26/01
State Tax Commission in this Constitution,
2001 UTApp 138
the Legislature may authorize any court
established under Article VIII to adjudicate,
Third District, Salt Lake Department
review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter
The Honorable Glenn K. Jwasaki
decided by the State Tax Commission . . .
relating to revenue and taxation as provided
ATTORNEYS:
by statute.
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Scott A. Call, and Jon V. Id. (emphasis added). The trial court focused on the
Harper, Salt Lake City, and Philip Gordon, Boise, word "decided" in Article XIII, Section 11(5) and
Idaho, for Appellants
concluded in a memorandum decision that "it would
Mark L. Shurtleff and Clark L. Snelson, Salt Lake be an unconstitutional infringement for the Court in
City, for Appellee
this case to decide these matters in the first instance
without allowing the Tax Commission the
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Thome.
opportunity to address the issue." On appeal, the
Commission argues that prior to seeking judicial
review of a rule, Article XIII, Section 11(5) requires
This opinion is subject to revision before
nuhlimlinn
if iho Pns>i/i>~ P / i n i ^ M ^
a oartvto brine the issue before the Tomr iiccirm i n '
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supervision), Mr. deGroot first tried to blame it on the plans, an argument he could not support
Then he tried to argue that the plans showed a 36 inch tub, but because a 42 inch tub was installed
it crowded the window. However, review of the plans (C-2, p. 2) showed a 42 inch tub was
contemplated. Mr. deGroot then claimed that the tub was not installed until after the framing
was done. This claim was destroyed by Ex. C-5(b), an exhibit that Mr. deGroot did not proffer,
undoubtably because it referenced the reversed NO CHARGE mentioned above and because
it referenced the plumber's installation of the tub prior to the framer's final draw. Mr. deGroofs
position in this matter has been one argument after another, on a fruitless search for supporting
evidence.
The arbitrator may recall that several times during the hearing, when mention was made
of Mr. deGroot's characterization, as shown in Exhibit R-l, that the rock retaining wall was
complete on October 30,1999, Mr. deGroot said more than once, "We'll have to change that."
Mr. deGroofs unbridled willingness to change his story to fit his claims is obvious, and should
not be rewarded.
CONCLUSION
Mr. deGroofs claim should be reduced as follows:
PRINCIPAL
Less: Improper bills
Retaining wall
Framing
Driveway
Water Line
TOTAL DUE

$ 10,625.11
(1,243.03)
(3,558.71)
(1,510.90)
(1,580.00)
(L900.00^
S 832.47
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PAUL de GROOT BUILDING SERVICES, L L C . -2389 WEST DAYBREAKER DR., PARK CITY, UT 84098

moicEm

) 649-6696 wk/hm

(435) 649-3470 fax

12/01/99
Matt DeWall - 214 Norfolk, Richard Gallacher - 220 Norfolk, Lance Richards - 226 Norfolk
Description: Final Billing for Utility Construction Work

For.

H date H

SCRIPTiON
Dervision, Traffic Control

Name

10/29-11/4 Dave

HdtZlC
^7.5

cost

IL code | Q subtotal

DC

TOTAL

35.00

|

262.50
262.50!

TALIN-HOUSETABOR

*>re Concrete Cutting
jerson Lumber-PT 6x6 for temp, electrical
rk City Excavation - Final Billing as to Utility Contract
The following was billed to 214 and 226 but is common for all 3 homes
Set rocks for water meter box between 226 and 220
Set rocks for water meter box between 220 and 214
Set rocks behind house 226 and 220
Set rocks behind house 220 and 214

262.50
59.31

v

/ l/.2)#fo,ZBD.0O

i

r«V, WJ 2,968.00
2($T 3,068.00
2/6 j 623.50
^ - 1 1,084.00

move 4 loads of debrie from 226 that was stock plied arid removed during its excavation @$150

% HH3

600.00

TAL MATERIAL. SUBCONTRACT & OTHER COSTS
TAL IN-HOUSE LABOR
5% BUILDER FEE ON OTHER COSTS ONLY
)TAL AMOUNT NOW DUE

12,365.31
262.50
1,854.80
14,482.61

1/3 to Matt Dewall
1/3 to Richard Gallacher
1/3 to Lance Richards

4,827.54
4,827.54
4U827.54

)TAL AMOUNT NOW DUE

14,482.61

TERMS: INVOICES ARE DUE AND PAYABLE UPON RECEIPT. INVOICES NOT PAID WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER DATE OF INVOICE WILL BE CHARGED 25% A MONTH INTEREST •
2% TRANSACTION F E E * $25.00 SERVICE CHARGE. SHOULD COLLECTION BECQUE NECESSARY, THE OJEhn - AGREES TO PAY A U FEES, LIEN W A R G E S AND ATTORNEYS
FEES, C C * ^ OF W C C E 8 A W TIME 6HEET8 ARE A V A I L S

MANY OF THESE ITEMS HAVE ALREADY BEEN PAJD IN YOUR BEHALF. PLEASE PAY PROMPTLY.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR

BUSINESS

YOUR CHECK IS YOUR RECEIPT

• e$T of)

i zo\i
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I had a copy of the Reply
Memorandum of Plaintiff mailed to John Call, attorney for
defendants, 333 N. 300 W., Salt Lake C > t ^ Utah/^f'4103, this 20th
day of August, 2001, by U.S. Mail,

/
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No,
JOHN L. McCOY (2164)
Attorney for Plaintiff
10 W. Broadway, Suite #310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-6400
FAX NO.:
(801) 596-2336
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH

PAUL deGROOT BUILDING SERVICES,
:
LLC.,
Plaintiff , :
vs.

REPLY MEMORANDUM

:
'

RICHARD T. GALLACHER and R.T.
GALLACHER INVESTMENTS, L L C ,

:

Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 000600252
JUDGE:

Hilder

FACTS:
1.
full-

It is not true that Gallacher has paid the award in

While negotiations have been ongoing, as to the principal

and interest, Gallacher has never tendered the $250.00 in
arbitration fees awarded to deGroot.
2.

The plaintiff takes the position that the

arbitrator, under Orton exceeded his jurisdiction if he made any
ruling beyond his authority under the arbitration agreement.

The

arbitration agreement was silent as to attorneys fees or any
rights under the mechanics lien statute.

Thus, any part of the

arbitrator's ruling as to both of these issues other than to say
that the arbitrator had no authority to rule in any respect as to
these issues, is beyond the authority of the arbitrator.
3. The Gallachers, in their reply memorandum believe
that paragraph 15.8 of the contract, having the following
language bars the filing of a mechanics lien or the awarding of
attorneys fees by the following language:
"15.8 All claims or disputes between the contractor
and the owner arising out of or relating to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

contract documents or the breach thereof shall be
decided by arbitration."
4. All that this clause does is refer to claim or
disputes arising out of or related to the contract documents or
the breach thereof- There is no mention in the contract
documents of either mechanics liens or attorneys fees or any
statutory rights.
5. Gallacher does not dispute the facts set forth in
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of deGroot's memorandum, pursuant to Rule
4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, thus the following
are established facts in this case.
6. Prior to the institution of the instant foreclosure action, Gallacher was billed by deGroot, he was sent a
copy of the mechanics lien and a demand letter by certified mail,
return receipt requested, all of which Gallacher ignored.
7. Only after being sued in this lien foreclosure
action, did Gallacher respond in any way, and that was a motion
to arbitrate.
8. At no time in this foreclosure proceeding or in the
arbitration did Gallacher offer to mediate, make any offer of
settlement or make any offer of judgment even though in the
arbitration proceeding he admitted that he owed deGroot money.
9. Instead, Gallacher has persisted in requiring the
full arbitration of this matter, which is not the "quick,
inexpensive" resolution of disputes that the American Arbitration
Association claims that it is. Instead, it has cost deGroot
$2,720.15 as his one-half of arbitration costs to decide several
issues, totaling less than $10,000.00 and in addition, paying
his attorney to represent him.
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ARGUMENT:
I
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO MODIFY IS
SIMPLY TO ASSURE THAT THE DECISION
OF THE ARBITRATOR CANNOT BE CONSTRUED
TO AFFECT THE POWER AND DUTY OF THIS
COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES.
The only intent of plaintiff's motion to modify is to
make it clear that any part of the arbitrator's decision
appearing to limit the legal power and duty of this court to
award attorneys fees is quite clearly beyond the powers of the
arbitrator. Any other interpretation would be a violation of
§78-31a-15 (1) (b): "The arbitrator's award is based on a matter
not submitted to them..." and the ruling by the Supreme Court in
Pacific Development v. Orton, 2001 UT. 36, 23 P3rd 1035, 1040.
DeGroot cites Orton for the proposition that an arbitrator cannot
decide a matter such as a statutory right to attorneys fees never
mentioned in the original arbitration agreement which is exactly
what part of the arbitrator's decision could be construed as
doing. Such a position is not "manifest disagreement" with the
decision of the arbitrator, as Gallacher argues, it is simply in
keeping within the above statute and Orton.
II
GALLACHER CITES NO CASE LAW TO SUPPORT
THE POSITION THAT DEGROOT WAIVED HIS
RIGHTS TO A MECHANICS LIEN AND ATTORNEY FEES.
Gallachers cite absolutely no cases in Utah or other
jurisdictions for the proposition that by signing the above
agreement, deGroot waived his rights to a mechanics lien or
attorneys fees thereunder.

The case law in Utah has been for

over 100 years, that in order to waive such a statutory right,
such an agreement must contain language expressly waiving such
statutory rights.

The contract between the parties never once

mentions mechanics liens, attorneys fees or any statutory rights
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in any respect, thus this agreement cannot legally waive
deGroot's statutory rights to a mechanics lien and attorneys fees
in this case.
Gallachers make a great deal of the fact that deGroot
never resisted their motion for arbitration,

DeGroot simply

wanted a decision by some intelligent decision maker, to get a
decision and go on.

In fact the arbitrator's award has been

entered for several months.

Despite that fact, Gallacher has

never made an offer to pay it until plaintiff's second motion to
enter judgment.

It is dubious that Gallacher would be concerned

about paying this long outstanding obligation if a mechanics lien
and a Lis Pendens had not been filed upon the county records of
this property.
The fact is that Gallacher had it completely within his
power to settle, pay or not to pay or offer a judgment in this
proceeding or the arbitration.

The original contract was a cost

plus contract to build a residence in Park City to a 4-way
inspection, an undertaking which could have amounted to over
$100,000.00.

Who controlled the amount involved in litigation or

arbitration?

Gallacher.

If the court does not award deGroot his

attorneys fees incurred in this foreclosure proceeding and the
arbitration, it is encouraging litigants, as Gallacher upon a
$10,000.00 bill to say "sue me" or "arbitrate",

because they

know that it is not economic to litigate or arbitrate no matter
how just the cause.
The policy urged by Gallacher leaves persons in
deGroot's position, who have, without question,
property owner effectively without a remedy.
laws were intended to be
situation from occurring.
(Utah 1982).

given value to a

The mechanics lien

remedial and enacted to prevent such a
Calder Bros, v. Anderson, 652 P2d 922,

Further, Utah courts have refused to defeat a lien

because of technicalities or nice distinctions.

Park City Meats

v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 Utah 145, 103 P254 (1909).
The reason for the statutory requirement that an owner
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

be sent a copy of the mechanics lien by certified mail, return
receipt, requests, is to give that owner an opportunity to offer
to pay or negotiate a settlement of the claim.

If that owner

refuses to do so after such letter is sent and no settlement
reached, and the claiming party files an action to foreclose the
mechanics lien, if that party is successful, they are entitled to
attorneys fees as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION:
This court is now duty bound to disregard any part of
the arbitrator's decision which would infer to the court that
only the fees for bringing the foreclosure action would be
awardable. The case law is clear that the arbitration agreement
did not waive deGroot's rights under the mechanics lien laws.
DeGroot was clearly the successful party; the arbitration was a
necessary part of the process to conclude the mechanics lien
procedure.

DeGroot's reasonable fees as shown in the affidavit

attached to the previous motion to enter judgment should be
awarded, as well as the further attorneys fees incurrred since
said affidavit was filed.
tf.
/?
DATED this <£ ^ 2ay of March, 2002.

orney for Plaintiff
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I had a copy of Plaintiff's Reply
Memorandum and Request for Oral Argument was mailed to John Call,
attorney for defendants, 333 N. 300 W., Salt Lake City, Utah
84103, this V*

day of March, 2002,
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JOHN L. McCOY (2164)
Attorney for Plaintiff
10 W. Broadway, Suite #310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-6400
FAX NO,:
(801) 596-2336
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH

PAUL deGROOT BUILDING SERVICES,
LLC,,
Plaintiff ,
vs,
RICHARD T. GALLACHER and R.T.
GALLACHER INVESTMENTS, L L C ,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
MODIFY THE ARBITRATOR'S
DECISION TO ENTER
JUDGMENT AND AWARD
ATTORNEYS FEES
Civil No. 000600252
JUDGE:
Hilder

Plaintiff hereby moves the court to modify the
arbitrator's decision as to attorneys fees, to award a judgment,
affirming the arbitrator's award of principal and interest due
from the defendant's to the plaintiff, to award attorneys fees to
the plaintiff as the successful party in the arbitration
proceeding and this proceeding.
This motion is based upon the Memorandum of Law
attached hereto.

;

Partial evidence of the amount of plaintiff's

attorneys fees had already been submitted in a previous motion.
The attorneys fees which have been incurred since that motion
shall be submitted in seven (7) days.
DATED this 5th day of March, 2002.

torney for

Pl^irfitiff
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JOHN L. MCCOY (2164)
Attorney for Plaintiff
10 W. Broadway, Suite #310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-6400
FAX NO.:
(801) 596-2336
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH

PAUL deGROOT BUILDING SERVICES,
:
LLC,
Plaintiff , :
::
:

vs.
RICHARD T. GALLACHER and R.T.
GALLACHER INVESTMENTS, LLC,

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO ENTER
JUDGMENT ON ARBITRATOR'S
AWARD & MOTION TO MODIFY
ARBITRATOR'S AWARD
CIVIL NO. 000600252
JUDGE:

Hilder

The plaintiff, in support of the motion to enter
judgment on the arbitrator's award and motion to modify the
arbitrator's award and to award attorneys fees herewith submits
the following memorandum:
1.

The arbitrator had previously found upon the

plaintiff's claim of about $10,000,00, that the defendant owed
the plaintiff the sum of $8,636.43, plus interest at the rate of
10% to the date of payment
2.

The matter of attorneys fees has been remanded by

the Court to the arbitrator to explain his original decision or
to decide the matter of attorney fees under applicable law.
3. The arbitrator on the 14th day of February, 2002,
chose to clarify his original decision, a copy of which is
attached at Exhibit 1, as to attorney fees, and after referring
to Section 38-1-17 and other provisions of Utah law that make it
clear that only a court has the power to award attorneys fees
under the mechanics lien statute and ruled as follows:
"The arbitrator concluded, therefore, that any
attorney's fees to be awarded in the dispute
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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between the parties would be those incurred in
connection with the court proceeding to foreclose
the mechanic's lien and that the authority to
make such an award is reserved to the court."
4.

However, the arbitrator, further made the following

ruling:
"Any attorney's fees to be awarded in the
dispute between the parties would be those
incurred in connection with the court
proceeding to foreclose the mechanic's lien..."
5. In this case, prior to any legal proceedings, in
addition to being billed by deGroot, Gallacher received a demand
letter by certified mail, return receipt requested, together with
the mechanics lien, and thereafter was served with a complaint in
this proceeding. (Affidavit of plaintiff's counsel).
6. At no time in these proceedings or the arbitration
did Gallacher make an offer of settlement, an offer of judgment
or offer to mediate or otherwise negotiate this matter (see
affidavit of counsel attached). In one of his memoranda to the
arbitrator, Gallacher admitted owing deGroot the sum of $863.00.
(Exhibit 4)
7. Gallacher insisted on arbitration which required
deGroot to pay $500.00 to initiate the arbitration, then another
$2,220.15 to American Arbitration Association to pay one-half of
the arbitrator's costs. The arbitrator ordered Gallacher to pay
one-half of the $500.00 fee, but left deGroot to bear one-half of
the arbitration costs, or the sum of $2,470.15 which was within
the powers of the arbitrator. (Affidavit of counsel).
ARGUMENT:
I
A PART OF THE DECISION BY THE
ARBITRATOR SHOULD BE MODIFIED.
The decision of the arbitrator, so far as it appears to
decide any issues as to attorney's fees to be decided by this
court must be modified by this court and declared to be beyond
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the powers of the arbitrator. The arbitrator recognized the
holding in Pacific Development v. Qrton, 2001 Ut. 36, that an
arbitrator exceeded its authority under Section 78-31a-15,

if it

attempted to decide issues which were not specifically authorized
to be arbitrated within the four corners of the original
arbitration agreement*

While the arbitrator seemed to recognize

this principle, a literal reading of the following portion of his
decision is in direct violation of Qrton, wherein the arbitrator
ruled:
"Any attorney's fees to be awarded in the
dispute between the parties would be those
incurred in connection with the court
proceeding to foreclose the mechanic's lien..."
This part of the arbitrator's "clarification" must be
stricken, as it appears the arbitrator is ruling that only the
attorneys fees incurred in the filing of the action to foreclose
the mechanic's lien case could be awarded to deGroot.

Such a

ruling could be an attempt to limit the amount of attorneys fees
awardable in this case by the court.

This ruling is, on its face

not authorized under the Arbitration Agreement, and indeed is
beyond the power of the arbitrator, under Section 38-31a-15(b)
U.C.A.

of the Utah Arbitration Act, to wit, this is a matter to

be decided by this court in accordance with applicable law, which
is contained in Section 38-1-1 et. seq. dealing with mechanic's
liens.
It is the position of deGroot that attorney's fees
under the mechanics lien statute are to be awarded not only for
the filing of the lien and the commencement of this action, but
also for the attorneys fees required to bring this matter to a
resolution in the arbitration proceeding.

Any portion of the

ruling by the arbitrator which could be construed otherwise
should be stricken as under Qrton above, the arbitrator does not
have jurisdiction and such a ruling is beyond the powers vested
in the arbitrator, thus, would be disregarded by this court.
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II
THE CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES CONTAINS
NO WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO FILE A
MECHANICS LIEN OR ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
BE AWARDED TO THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY,
THESE RIGHTS WERE RETAINED BY DEGROOT.
Nowhere in the contract of the parties is the matter of
attorney's fees mentioned in the event of breach by either party
which applies to this case. Nor is there any language in the
contract waiving deGroot's rights to a mechanics lien and the
attorneys fees awardable under the mechanics lien statute.

The

language required in an agreement to waive such rights must be
expressly made.

Doane v. Clinton, 2 Utah 417, (1877) Utah Lexis

62; see also, 73 ALR 3rd, 1042, 1046.

There is no language

dealing with or limiting deGroot's right as to such issues,
therefore, the bundle of rights created by Section 38-1-1

for

contractors who bestow permanent improvements upon land, such as
deGroot who was owed money from the owner retain all of those
rights under the terms of the written

arbitration agreement in

this case.
Under such circumstances, the general rule in the
United States is that attorney's fees expended during the
arbitration proceedings are to be awarded under the mechanic's
lien statute where requested by the prevailing or successful
party.

53 Am Jur 2d. 445 §463.

Sentry Engineering &

Construction v. Mariners Cay Dev. Corp., 287 SC 346, 338 SE 2d
631 (1985); Harris v. Dyer, Or. 637 P2d 918 (1981).

The policy

reason given in both cases is that the resolution of the dispute
between the parties in arbitration is a necessary part of the
mechanics lien procedure to arrive at the true amount to be
foreclosed.

Further, if attorneys fees under the mechanics lien

statute are not awarded for this part of the process, litigants
would not be favorable to submitting their cases to arbitration.
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In the instant case, the logic of the foregoing cases
is clearly seen.

Gallacher steadfastly refused to make any

payment upon deGroot's billings which amount to about $10,000.00,
and thereby forced deGroot to file a mechanics lien to secure
payment.

A demand letter,

together with the mechanics lien was

then sent to Gallacher by certified mail, return receipt
requested,

with

or arbitrate.

no response from Gallacher to settle, mediate

DeGroot then filed this foreclosure action and

served Gallacher, who appeared and moved for arbitration.

Still,

no offer of judgment or any other offer in settlement was made by
Gallacher in either this mechanics lien case or the arbitration
proceeding.

Counsel for deGroot,

prior to requesting

arbitration suggested that the parties negotiate the matter,
which was refused; then counsel for deGroot requested mediation
which was also refused by Gallacherfs counsel.
The rules of arbitration require a $500.00 fee to be
paid to institute the arbitration, and the American Association
of Arbitration then required both parties to advance the sum of
$2,220.15 to be paid prior to arbitration.

The arbitrator

required written memoranda to be filed by both parties prior to
the arbitration

hearing and then further written memoranda be

submitted in lieu of oral argument with a reply memoranda to be
submitted by both parties.

Such procedures are expensive.

In the course of submitting such closing memoranda,
Gallacher admitted that even by the best calculations of his
counsel, that he still owed deGroot the sum of $832.47. Nevertheless, Gallacher never once offered any sum as a settlement or
a judgment in this matter.
Under such circumstances, arbitration is not
inexpensive.

It is extremely expensive if not totally

impractical when one is forced to resort to it upon a claim of
approximately

$10,000.00 such as deGroot has had to do here, to

advance $2,720.15 to AAA, then in addition pay an attorney to
prosecute both of those actions.
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In this case, Gallacher had the option of avoiding all
of the above expenditures by deGroot.

He could have made a

reasonable offer of settlement, mediated or made an offer of
judgment in either this action or the arbitration proceeding.
Gallacher deliberately chose not to do so, instead requiring
deGroot to proceed with the arbitration of this case to its
conclusion and and to file a previous motion and memoranda to
this court for the award plus attorneys fees.
Ill
THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT
DEGROOT WAS THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY
AND ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES
FOR THIS ACTION AND THE ARBITRATION.
This court should make a finding as to who was the
"successful party", under Section 38-1-17, Utah Mechanics lien
law. The arbitrator awarded the plaintiff approximately 85% on
the merits of its original claim. The only claim of defendants
allowed by the arbitrator was an offset of $745.90. Utah case law
is consistent in granting attorneys fees in mechanics lien cases
to either party who succeeds on the merits of their case.
Bailey-Allen Co. Inc. v. Kurzetr 876 P2d 421 (Ut App 1994). The
Court of Appeals in Kurzet reversed the trial court denial of
attorney fees as an abuse of discretion and remanded for a
determination of the amount of those fees under the guidelines
established in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P2d at p. 989,
upon the same guidelines as the plaintiff has asked this court to
determine fees in the instant case.
How could reasonable minds differ as to whether deGroot
was successful on the merits of this claim? The defendant in
Bailey-Allen, Supra, only won a dismissal of a mechanics lien and
bond law claim and nothing more, yet it was a breach of
discretion under Utah law for the trial court to not award the
defendant attorneys fees. For an example of how successful
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deGroot was in the arbitration, page 11 of Gallacher's counsel's
closing memorandum to the arbitrator is attached hereto showing
that if the arbitrator found for Gallacher on all of the claims
presented, Gallacher would still owe deGroot the sum of $832.47.
Yet, nowhere in these proceedings or in the arbitration did
Gallacher

make any offer of settlement or motion to enter

judgment in favor of deGroot for any sum whatsoever. Instead
Gallacher fought this claim every step of the way and even though
his own calculations show that he owed deGroot money on this job,
Gallacher now claims that no liability exists as to the
defendants for the attorneys fees necessary to bring this case to
a conclusion,

despite the fact that the entitlement to such fees

is clearly and mandatorily set forth by statute.
This procedure has been followed before by a Utah Court
under arbitration.

See Cellcom v. Systems Communication

Corp., 939 P2d 185 (Utah App. 1997) where an arbitration
agreement did deal with attorneys fees, but since the parties
never followed that agreement, the Court of Appeals remanded to
the trial court for a determination of those fees under Section
38-1-18 U.C.A. since a mechanics lien had been filed.
In addition, in the case of Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake
Trappers, 925 P2d 941, 953, (Utah 1996), the court made the
comment that a provision of Utah providing for attorneys fees
N>

'promote [ed] the public policy of encouraging early payment of

valid arbitration awards and discourage[ed] non-meritorious
protracted confirmation challenges'".

Likewise, in the instant

case, the awarding of attorney fees in a case where an amount
owed was admitted would discourage needless arbitration hearings.
In other states, with similar arbitration statutes to
Utah have concluded that where an arbitration agreement in fact
provided for attorneys fees to the "prevailing party", and the
arbitration award found on the merits against a claimant, but
found that the parties should bear their own attorneys fees, that
such a finding was error under a Washington

statute which
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provided as follows:
"In any of the following cases the court shall
after notice and hearing make an order vacating
the award, upon the application of any party to
the arbitration:
•• •

4. Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers
or so imperfectly executed them that a final
and definite award upon the subject matter was
not made,/'
The Washington Court of Appeals in Agnew v. Lacey Co-ply, 654 P2d
712, 60 ALR 5th 669, 720, (Wash. App. 1983) held that an
arbitrator exceeded its powers did not have any discretion with
regard to entitlement of a prevailing party to attorneys fees,
except to determine the amount of such fees.
The Lacey Court, citing the need for parties to be
confident that the law will be followed by arbitrators, commented
as follows:
"The policy which encourages arbitration would be
undermined if contracting parties perceived that
lawful contractual provisions, negotiated and
expressly agreed upon, could be ignored by the
arbitration tribunal."
In Lacey, the above language referred to an agreement.
In the instant case, the language is that of Section 38-1-17
U.C.A. which makes the award of attorney fees mandatory to the
successful party.
Certainly, if contracting parties perceived
that their unrelinquished statutory rights are given away in an
arbitration agreement never mentioning those rights, such parties
would not be inclined to sign such agreements.
While the language in Lacey refers to the Arbitration
Agreement, in the instant case it is important that the attorneys
fees also incurred in the arbitration proceeding should awarded
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by this court because only by the expenditure of those fees could
the foreclosure proceeding be brought to a conclusion.
CONCLUSION:
The motion of the plaintiff to modify the arbitration
decision as to attorneys fees only and affirm the award of
principal and interest and to award attorneys fees should be
granted by this court because deGroot never waived any rights
under the mechanics lien statute including attorneys fees;
deGroot was the successful party in this foreclosure proceeding
and the arbitration proceeding, both of which were necessary to
bring this matter to a conclusion.
DATED this 5th day of March, 2002.

torney for Plai
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION TOIBUNAL
In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Re:

81 110 00010 01 TMS
Paul deGroot Building Services, LLC
and
Richard T. Gallacher etal.

ADMINISTRATOR: Ten M. Salazar

DISPOSITION OF REFERRAL FOR CLARIFICATION OF AWARD
I, THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR, having been designated in accordance
with the arbitration agreement entered into by Paul deGroot Building (hereinafter known
as "Claimant") and Richard T. Gallacher and Gallacher Investments, L.L.C, (hereinafter
known as 'Respondent"), and dated May 24, 1999, and having been duly sworn and
having previously duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, and having
previously rendered an Award dated July 19, 2001, and in an Order dated November 12,
2001, Robert KL Hilder, District Court Judge, in the matter of Paul deGroot Building
Services, Ll.C, Plaintiff, v. RichardT. Gallacher and RT Gallacher Investments,
LLC, Defendants, Civil No. 000600252, filed in the Third Judicial District Court for
Summit County, State of Utah,"... referred back to the Arbitrator, Harold C. Verhaarcn,
Esq., for either clarification of his decision not to award fees, or to amend the judgment
as he sees fit regarding attorney's fees, under applicable law, and having reviewed and
considered the memoranda submitted on behalf of the parties relating to the attorney's fee
issue, I do make the following rulinp and clarification of my earlier decision not to award
attorney's fees to either party:"""
The parties concede that the agreement to arbitrate contains no attorney's fee
provision. It was and remains the conclusion of the Arbitrator that the agreepsnlJo
aibitr^controls the_scope of the arbitration and the authority of the arbitrator. That
conclusion is supported by several Utah cases, including Pacific Development v. Orton,
23 P.3rd 1035 (Utah 2001). Accordingly, absent an attorney's fee provision in the
parties' agreement to arbitrate, thejirhitrator has no authority to award attorney!sLfees.
Further, it is the opinion of the Arbitrator that, in any_eventJ.a mechanic's lien foreclosure
proce^ingj^lsoutside the authority and jurisdiction of an_arbitrator^jt is, by statute,*
judicSPproceeding. The claim for and right to attorney's f^s~cferivcs from the
mechanic's lien statute. UTAH CODE ANN. §38-1-18 specifically provides that
reasonable attorney's fees are to be "fixed by the court." Also, § 38-1-15 provides: "The
court shall cause the property to be sold in satisfaction of the liens and costs as in the case
of foreclosure of mortgages . . . " and 38-1-17 specifics that "... as between the owner
and the contractor, the court shall apportion the costs according to the right of the case
" (Emphasis added.) T h e ^ ^ ^
b
glHggd^ ipJke dispute between the parties would be those^mcun-^ gyggmection with
tj^ggg^^
mechanic's lien and that the authority tomake such
a£ award is reserved to the Court. """"
* "
"— —======--In all other respects my Award dated July 19,2001, is reaffirmed and remains in full
force and effect

SlG^^/M/^^jf^f^
Q

'
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